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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2): 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction ... 
over: 
... 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic 
relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, 
support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
In addition, under U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(3), the Court of Appeals 
may upon its own Motion certify to the Supreme Court for original 
appellate review and determination any matter over which the 
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issue in this case is whether the District Court, in its 
order and findings of June 30, 1993, correctly interpreted the 
meaning of the term "disclosure" as that term was used in 
paragraph 10 of the court's Order of August 28, 1987. [See 
Addendum A - FINDING OF FACTS AND ORDER] The court's June 30, 
1993 findings and order reads at paragraph 8: 
8. The Court finds that Plaintiff has filed her 
Motion to Set Aside pursuant to Paragraph 10 of the 
August 28, 1987 Order. Furthermore, the Court finds 
that the term "disclosure" as used in Paragraph 10 
means either a disclosure by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff, independent knowledge of the Plaintiff 
concerning property, or knowledge of the Plaintiff 
concerning property pursuant to her own investigation. 
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Plaintiff-Appellant submits that the choice to exert 
tremendous effort to discover is not the same as a disclosure by 
the opposing side. 
The standard of review in a domestic case seeking a new 
trial to readjust property awards was stated in Watson v. Watson, 
561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977): 
[T]he rule is that when it is made to appear that the court 
has failed to correctly apply principles of law or equity, 
or that the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings, or that the judgment has so failed to do equity 
that it manifests a clear abuse of discretion, this court on 
review will take appropriate corrective action in the 
interests of justice. 
In the context of a case interpreting the terms of a 
contract this court stated in Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 
P.2d 1080 (Utah App. 1988) [Quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 714 
P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986)]: 
[T]he interpretation of contract language presents us with a 
question of law on which we need not defer to the trial 
court's construction but are free to render our independent 
interpretation. 
In the even narrower context of a case interpreting the 
words in a court order, this court recently stated in In Re The 
Estate of Leone, Southwick, v. Leone, 222 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (Utah 
App. 1993): 
Court orders are subject to the same rules of construction 
that apply to other written instruments. ... When a trial 
court interprets the unambiguous language of an order, we 
review the court's interpretation for correctness. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, or rules that are determinative. The motion of the 
Plaintiff-Appellant was based upon Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 60(b), which is set forth verbatim as Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff-Appellant, Joyce K. Jacobsen (Kalanquin), 
filed a complaint for dissolution of her marriage to the 
Defendant-Appellee, Shirley F. Jacobsen, July 23, 1986. After 
some discovery on both sides a Stipulation Agreement regarding 
property distribution was signed by both parties on August 27, 
1986. [See Addendum C - STIPULATION] The court's order of 
August 28, 1987 relied upon and incorporated the terms of the 
stipulation. [See Addendum D - ORDER] 
A divorce decree was subsequently entered September 17, 
1987. [See Addendum E - DECREE OF DIVORCE] Plaintiff-Appellant 
submitted her motion to set aside and reopen issues of property 
settlement on November 27, 1987 - within 3 months of the divorce 
decree. [See Addendum F - MOTION TO SET ASIDE DIVORCE DECREE AND 
FOR NEW TRIAL ON ISSUES OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENT] 
The Motion recites that instead of having a trial, August 
28, 1987, the parties stipulated on August 27, 1987. That was 
when they exchanged discovery materials and other evidence that 
purportedly showed all the Defendant-Appellee's assets and his 
income since the parties were married in 1976. The Motion states 
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that the Plaintiff-Appellant entered into the property settlement 
based upon the information given to her by the Defendant-
Appellee. The Motion to reopen relied on the provision in the 
Settlement Stipulation that provided for a reopening of the case 
in the event other assets were discovered which should have been 
disclosed before the settlement. 
The Motion alleged that more money had been received by the 
Defendant-Appellee from the sale of property owned in certain 
real estate developments than the Defendant-Appellee had 
accounted for, and that other monies had been moved from 
Defendant-Appellee's account(s) into accounts of others, in 
excess of $200,000. Plaintiff-Appellant alleged these and other 
matters had not been disclosed to her. She said that she 
believed, based on the information available to her, that 
Defendant-Appellee took substantially more money from their 
business during the marriage than had been represented at the 
time of the settlement; and that the basis for the settlement 
formulation was in error; and therefore, the settlement should be 
set aside and the property distribution matter fully heard. Her 
Motion was supported by the Plaintiff-Appellant's Affidavit dated 
December 3, 1987 [see Addendum F-2 - AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF]. 
Not much was done with respect to the Plaintiff-Appellant's 
Motion until about a year before the Court's final Order. By 
then, she was back in the area, having fled the Defendant-
Appellee, and able to concentrate on this case. The Court allowed 
less pre-hearing discovery than the Plaintiff-Appellant had asked 
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for, and less than she believes the Court promised. At one time 
the Court said that it would require the Defendant-Appellee to 
answer questions about when properties were acquired, when they 
were sold, and what happened to the money. The Court also said 
Plaintiff-Appellant would be entitled to have a trial discussing 
all of the property. The Plaintiff-Appellant asked such 
questions about 150 or so assets by written Interrogatories. The 
Court had specified the kind of questions she could ask, but 
ultimately the Trial Court did not insist on the Defendant-
Appellee providing answers to the Court-ordered detailed 
discovery questions. After the trial hearing on Plaintiff-
Appellant's Motion, the Court found the Plaintiff-Appellant did 
not meet her burden of proof and denied her any relief. This 
generated the present appeal. 
The Court ruled that the Plaintiff-Appellant had had some 
limited knowledge about all the property. This limited knowledge 
was independent of Defendant-Appellee's actual disclosures on or 
about August 27, 1987. But, the Court ruled that when coupled 
with the limited disclosure from the Defendant-Appellee, the 
Plaintiff-Appellant was sufficiently on notice of all of the 
Defendant-Appellee's assets and that this constituted "full and 
complete disclosure." 
The Plaintiff-Appellant asserted that since the Defendant-
Appellee had not fully disclosed all his property, she could not 
rely on the property Settlement Stipulation. Plaintiff-Appellant 
asserted the Defendant-Appellee was only allowed to rely on the 
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specifically disclosed and identified property and not his 
general references. To evaluate the property from general 
references would reguire additional knowledge and discovery on 
her part before an evaluation could be completed. Since he had 
not disclosed with specificity, she did not feel compelled to try 
to do such an evaluation in 1987. In fact, the only detailed 
descriptions of property in the Stipulation Agreement, drafted by 
the Defendant-Appellee's attorney, were the three pieces of real 
property that the Plaintiff-Appellant had acguired from 
inheritance monies. Defendant-Appellee had guit-claimed two of 
these to the Plaintiff-Appellant during the marriage! There were 
no descriptions and values in the Stipulation Agreement or other 
Court papers, of the numerous subdivisions, lots, and other 
assets that the Defendant-Appellee bought, sold, transferred, 
developed or retained. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
We are here to interpret this paragraph in a Stipulation 
Agreement [Addendum C] signed by the Plaintiff-Appellant and 
Defendant-Appellee on August 27, 1987: 
9. Disclosure. Each of the parties acknowledge that a 
full and complete disclosure of all property and debts 
incurred or acquired during the marriage has been made 
and should other property and debts later be 
discovered, an equitable Order would have to be entered 
at such time. 
The Stipulation was a contract between the parties. The 
terms of that contract are subject to the traditional rules of 
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construct. < j tne terms of contracts The above 
paragraph 9 of the Stipulation formed tfie batus lor and was 
incorporated into the Order of the District Court of August 28, 
1987 [Addenc ; ^ ±o therein. That Order Is thus 
subject: to interpretation using rules of euu^tru-rt i • .n foi 
interpretation wi contracts. Paragraph 9 of the Stipulation and 
paragraph ]0 of 4 - jasib for the decision and 
findings of fact of the District Court on June 30, ] 191 which 
precipitated this appeal. 
The critical issue in this case is the meaning of \ 
"disciosun?" used in paragraph 9 of the Stipulation and in 
paragraph 1.0 of the Order of. thfj Court of Auqust 28, 1987. This 
term should be assigned its ordinary meaning, modified only by 
the clear and unmistakable intent of the parties to use it in a 
different sense. The term, "disclosure11 hat: rommon meaning in the 
context of legal proceedings and contractual dealings. 
Definiti ^gal and secular lexicons are at odds 
with the expansive interpretation of the term given by the 
District Court. 
Using the context of the clause in whn h tin inrm 
"disclosure" I- ;< u; i as evidence of its meaning, the reasonable 
interpretatic . ;• is with the broad interpretation 
given by the District Court. In Paragraph ."* _ .n 
Agreement and again in Paragraph ,10 of th> :,:*.: • tntr District 
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Court, the term "disclosure" is modified by the adjectives "full 
and complete". Such modifiers clearly tend to restrict, rather 
than expand, the meaning of the term "disclosure". The District 
Court, in its Order of June 30, 1993, incorrectly tried to expand 
the meaning of "disclosure." 
Circumstances, words and actions of the parties may also be 
used to resolve ambiguities in the meaning of terms. In this 
case, ambiguity which may be found in the term "disclosure" 
should be resolved in favor of the Plaintiff-Appellant; contrary 
to the interpretation by the District Court. The complexity of 
the property settlement issues due to numerous, extensive, and 
sometimes secret real estate and business dealings of the 
Defendant-Appellee made discovery in this case difficult. The 
Plaintiff-Appellant, asked certain discovery questions and the 
Defendant-Appellee responded that he had made full and complete 
disclosure. The Defendant-Appellee's responses to discovery 
requests were incomplete and uncooperative. [See Addendum J -
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.] 
Because of the difficulty and expense of pursuing the 
discovery, Plaintiff-Appellant was induced to rely on the 
allegedly good-faith assertion of the Defendant-Appellee that he 
had made full and complete disclosure of his properties. Legal 
authority has required that where a husband has superior 
8 
knowledge uf int.erests and assets he has a higher than usual 
degree of responsibility to make a lulJ •Jiii-l I iii disclosure. 
Authority also holds that where a wife has some limited knowledge 
concerning asset;in; and faj is to be as diligent and insistent In 
discovery as she might have been that this <« -.- ve the 
husband of his responsibility to disclose no does it allow him 
to assert her alleged negligence and partial knowledge as a 
defense to his failure to disclose. 
Legal authority requires in a domestic property settlement 
action that the District Court defer to an interpretation that 
woul d 1 nsur e that fairness and equity are paid appropriate 
homage, The District Court's interpretation of the term 
"disclosure" in this case squelched full and open examination nl 
the pruperty An equitable distribution was neither allowed by 
the Defendant-Appellee nor attempted by the court. 
The Stipu " * + l riri upon which the District Court's Order of 
August 28, 1987 •.-..• based was drafted by the Defendant'"1!'' 
attorney. leg authority holds that ambiguities in the language 
of a document - • " .- ;\rued strictly against the drafter. The 
term "disclosure" should have been strictly construed against the 
Defendant-Appellee by the District Court, but was not. 
If the term "disclosure" is ambiguous -Jiid both Plaint j ff-
Appellant's and Defendant-Appellee's interpretations thereof are 
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reasonable then a "meeting of the minds" requisite to formation 
of a contract has not occurred. The Stipulation of August 27, 
1987 and the order based thereon are both void and the parties 
find themselves at the point immediately prior to the 
Stipulation. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The Stipulation Agreement of August 27, 1987 [Addendum C] was 
a contract and became the basis for the court's Order of August 
28, 1987 [Addendum D]. 
August 27, 1987, Mr. John Caine, attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant, met with the Defendant-Appellee, Shirley F. Jacobsen, 
and his attorney, Mr. Thomas Willmore. In that meeting, Attorney 
Willmore offered a Stipulation to Mr. Caine. Mr. Caine reviewed 
the offered document and subsequently persuaded the Plaintiff-
Appellant to agree to sign it, which she did. This offer and 
acceptance coupled with the consideration that this document then 
became mutually binding upon the parties created a contract 
between Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant-Appellee. This 
Stipulation of August 27, 1987 formed the basis for and was 
incorporated into the Order of the District Court of August 28, 
1987. That Order reads on Page 1: 
It is hereby Ordered that the Stipulation made and 
entered into by the parties hereto be and the same is 
hereby incorporated herein by reference. 
Paragraph 10 of the Court's Order, found on Page 5, states: 
10. That it has been represented to the Court that a 
full and complete disclosure of all property and debts 
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incurred or acquired during the marriage has been made 
and should other property or debts later be discovered, 
an equitable Order would have to be entered at such 
time. [Emphasis added.] 
This paragraph had as its counterpc > y> apa y irom 
the Stipulation found at Page 6, which reads: 
9. Disclosure. Each of the parties acknowledge that a 
full and complete disclosure of all property and debts 
incurred or acquired during the marriage has been made 
and should other property and debts later be 
discovered, an equitable Order would have to be entered 
at such time. [Emphasis added.] 
The task before the Court in the hearing to consider the 
Plaintiff-Appellc Aside the Divorce Decree and 
for a new trial of t issues oi property settlement, was b 
cieterii i ne the meaning of the term "disclosure" as used m the 
stipulation and order. Tt: • . . i± issue in this case, 
since the court's interpretation of "disclosure" has co"lore<J all 
01 the other significant findings of fact by the Court in its 
order of June 30, !9<n. Shou I d this Couii fin«i that the Trial 
Court's broad interpretation of the meaning of the term 
"disclosure-11 is incorrect, a re-hearing on all issues pertaining 
to the Plaintiff-Appellant's Moti< . r. 
2 a iur interpreting contracts require that 
effect be given the intent of the pan.ic: h. F<IIKI P lb/it the intent 
should be gleaned from an examination of the text of the 
contract. 
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The cardinal rule for interpreting contracts was declared in 
LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Co.. 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1988) at page 858. There the Court stated: 
The interpretation of a written contract may be a 
question of law determined by the words in the 
agreement. Buehner Block Co. v. U.W.C. Associates, 752 
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) In this regard, we recently 
stated that a cardinal rule in construing the contract 
is to give effect to the intentions of the parties; and 
if possible, these intentions should be gleaned from an 
examination of the text of the contract itself. 
3. The terms of contracts and orders of the court are to be 
given their ordinary meaning and harmonized with all contract 
provisions. 
The starting point to interpreting terms in a contract is 
stated in Nielsen v. O'Rielly. 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992): 
The terms of . . . all contracts are to be interpreted 
in accordance with their usually-accepted meanings and 
should be read as a whole in an attempt to harmonize 
and give effect to all of the contract provisions. 
Id., p. 665. 
The Court applied this fundamental rule of construction to the 
interpretation of terms in a Court Order as well. In re Estate 
of Leone Southwick v. Leone, Supra., at 61. 
4. The ordinary meaning of the term "disclosure" is the 
imparting of information from one having such to those who do 
not. 
The term "disclosure" is not so exotic as to be absent from 
the vocabulary of the ordinary person. It is a frequently-used 
term, especially in the context of legal proceedings and 
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c o n t r a c t u a i i leal i nqi\, In th<-! lecial s e t t i n g , • >-. common meaning 
of the term can be found in the Corpus Juris , - oa, 
page y/i: 
DISCLOSURE. The act of disclosing; a making known or 
revealing; and the term has also been defined as 
meaning to make known. The word "disclosure" evokes a 
certain subjective guality, namely, that which is clear 
in the vision of the average reader. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, page 551 is also 
helpl u I 1 n \\ Ini s re.ga r d . It reads: 
DISCLOSE. To bring into view by uncovering, to lay 
bare, to reveal to knowledge, to free from secrecy or 
ignorance, or make known. 
DISCLOSURE. Revelation; the impartation of that which 
is secret. 
The posit J n»ii «»| r he Defendant-Appellee adopted by the Trial 
Court in its findings is not that the Defendant-Appellee has made 
fiLil] and complete disclosure, and there is substantial evidence 
he did not. Rathei , • - : r the District Court, 
reflected in its June 30, 1994 Findings of Fact and Order 
[Addeiiduin A, paragraphs 8 through 23], is that the Plaintiff-
Appellant has made a disclosure of the assets and interests of 
the Defendant-Appellee, in which the Plaintiff-Appellai 
have an interest. *' interpretation makes the term 
"disclosure" virtuali v n "discovery" or 
"discoverable", While arguably such a definition of the word is 
allowable, it .is a meaning which is not readily drawn from the 
lexicographical definitions and. cannot reasonably be found to be 
the ordinary meaning of the word. 
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It is Plaintiff-Appellant's position that the common and 
ordinary meaning of the term "disclosure" implies giving, not 
simply discovering. This is evidenced by Black's definition of 
disclosure: "the impartation of that which is secret." To impart 
clearly requires possession beforehand of that which is imparted. 
If that which is imparted is discovery information and is secret 
it cannot be secret to him who imparts or else how shall he 
possess it or impart it? It can only be secret to him to whom it 
is imparted. In the ordinary sense when one discloses he imparts 
to another what was before undisclosed to that other. In the 
context of a domestic property settlement when one discloses he 
communicates to the other everything required for a complete 
analysis regardless of what the impartee knows or does not know. 
To "disclose" is to tell. To "discover" is to find out. In 
their ordinary meanings the terms are not synonymous. 
5. Giving effect to the terms "each" and "had been made" and 
harmonizing these with the term "disclosure" leads to the logical 
conclusion that "disclosure" meant impartation of information by 
the one who had it to the one who did not. 
It is important to examine carefully the clause in which the 
term "disclosure" has been used. The Utah Supreme Court stated 
in L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Co.. Supra: 
A contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all 
of its provisions and all of its terms, which terms 
should be given effect if it is possible to do so. [Id. 
at 858.] 
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Becau ' ui construing :i- meaning of a 
term .' " determine the intent of the partis : ; :?rf.-\.r? ' 
to examine the textual and circumstantial context in which the 
term is used. ;• s • ox August in, 1987, and in the 
Order of August 28, 1987, the documents stated that i disclosure 
„, _ been made". 
Two questions must be asked about the disclosure: "Made by 
whom •'M -<mJ "Made to whom?" Since the things to be disclosed at 
issue are the assets of the Defendant.-AppeI lee In which the 
Plaintiff-Appellant might have an interest, the absurdity of the 
Court's interpretation of the meaning of "disclosure" becomes 
obvious. Was i t the Plaintiff-Appellant '•• •'•tt;i.1 I. 'Mi srlose" 
to herself the things of which she had i detailed and particular 
knowledge? 0 i is it more reasonable to find that the intent of 
the Plaintiff-Appellant was to have the Defendant-AppeJ lee 
"disclose" ier the things which he had the special and 
particular * <• ncerninyi' Clear±y inc xatter is the only 
one that can reasonably be answered in the affirmative. 
6. Giving effect u t UP ICMHII* "in II" and "complete" focuses the 
meaning of disclosure. Assertion that the discover that 
actually occurred before the Stipulation was "full" and 
"complete" is inconsistent wi Lh tin-1, tacts 
The term "disclosure" was modified in both the Stipulation 
c :ie adjectives "full" and "complete" These 
15 
qualifying terms must be given effect. [See L.D.S. Hospital v. 
Capitol Life Insurance Co.. Supra.] The modification clearly 
tends to emphasize the meaning of the term to require the 
comprehensive and detailed impartation of information. To assert 
that Plaintiff-Appellant intended this narrow meaning of 
"disclosure" to refer to nominally successful discovery she had 
attempted and the generally unspecific disclosure she had 
received from the Defendant-Appellee is absurd. She was entitled 
to find any unfully and incompletely described property later and 
claim her share of the marital gain. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant's attempts to discover Defendant-
Appellee's assets and interests was mostly ineffective. The 
Defendant-Appellee's answers of May 1, 1987 to the Plaintiff-
Appellant's First Set of Interrogatories are illustrative. To 
the Plaintiff-Appellant's Interrogatory No. 32 [see Addendum G -
ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, page 15], requesting detailed and 
particularized information on any and all real property he owned, 
the Defendant-Appellee responded only that he had previously 
provided all deeds to property which he had an interest in. 
Plaintiff-Appellant asserts this is not true. Certain deeds were 
provided, but only for limited real estate holdings of the 
Defendant-Appellee. [See Appendix A - Summary of Property 
Disclosed by Defendant-Appellee at Time of Stipulation and 
Addendum H - DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY OF PROPERTY] 
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After the Stipulation of August 27, 1987 Plaintiff-Appellant 
knew of numerous other properties in which she believed 
Defendant-Appellee had interests. [See Appendix B - Summary 
Partial List of Property Not Disclosed by Defendant-Appellee 
Prior to Stipulation of August 27, 1987] At the time of the 
Stipulation she did not have certain and particular knowledge of 
what his interest was, or whether she might have a claim relating 
to it. Plaintiff-Appellant's attorney, John T. Caine, had 
presented a list of these other properties which were not in the 
Defendant-Appellee's discovery disclosures. Mr. Caine asked the 
Defendant-Appellee about each property specifically and was told 
by Defendant-Appellee concerning each one that the property 
either "did not exist or had no value or had been depleted in 
some fashion." [See Addendum I - AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL JOHN T. 
CAINE] She was assured by Mr. Caine and assumed in signing the 
Stipulation that if these properties were in fact part of the 
marital estate to which she had claim, then the Defendant-
Appellee had not made a full and complete disclosure to her and 
she would be able to later discover them more completely and 
claim her interest therein. 
In the Stipulation Agreement [Addendum C], drafted by 
Defendant-Appellee's attorney, interesting peculiarities exist. 
In describing who got what, individual listings and legal 
descriptions of the Plaintiff-Appellant's property were carefully 
inserted. On the other hand, individual listings and legal 
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descriptions for the Defendant-Appellee's property were carefully 
omitted. To have set forth these latter might have been "full 
and complete" disclosure on the part of the Defendant-Appellee, 
but it would also have ruined opportunities for subterfuge and 
consequently spoiled the settlement. 
It was the finding of the trial court that a full and 
complete disclosure has been made — by the Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Another reason this position is untenable is that the discovery 
by the Plaintiff-Appellant still had not revealed details which 
would allow her to complete her assertion of the values accrued 
in the marriage. Significant details were still not in her 
possession. Also, information she had was so obfuscated and 
cryptic that it was not apparent there were other assets to which 
she could lay claim. For the sake of argument, even if 
Plaintiff-Appellant had in her possession information which could 
have been put together to clearly show all of Defendant-
Appellee's assets, the fact that the information as provided was 
so complex and confusing that it was not readily apparent must 
lead the court to conclude that the assets were not disclosed 
because they were not in plain sight. See Salt Lake Citizens 
Congress v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.. 846 P.2d 
1245, 1253 (Utah 1992). 
Discovery in this case had been difficult and expensive. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant was of very limited financial and 
18 
emotional resources. Unless she had a divorce decree she would 
be unable to apply for social security, which she desperately 
needed. The Defendant-Appellee was not about to agree to the 
divorce unless she signed the Stipulation. Her legal Counsel, 
Attorney John Caine, encouraged her to sign the Stipulation 
because, as she understood, if Defendant-Appellee had not 
disclosed to her properties in which she had a claim then it 
could be reopened. Justification for her reliance on this has 
legal support. In McBride v. Jones, 615 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 
1980) the court stated: 
In some husband-wife relationships, it would not be 
unreasonable to believe that the husband had superior 
knowledge of property which he was handling in the 
family's interests; and that the wife would be 
justified in reposing confidence in his knowledge and 
his representations concerning value. In situations 
relating to family welfare, the parties should be held 
to a higher than usual degree of responsibility in 
making full and fair disclosure of the facts of which 
each has special knowledge. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant had a right to expect that the 
Defendant-Appellee would comply with his legal obligation to 
clearly disclose his assets as requested in discovery. While it 
may be viewed foolish of her to expect as much, the Defendant-
Appellee's failure to do so "will not be overlooked solely on the 
ground that the plaintiff is perhaps guilty of some degree of 
fault in not being as diligent as she might have been." Boyce v. 
Boyce. 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980). 
19 
7. Domestic cases are "equitable in the highest degree11 and 
especially deserving of care that a fair property settlement be 
afforded. 
In Watson v. Watson. 561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977), the Court 
overturned a District Court decision denying Plaintiff's motion 
to reopen a divorce case in order to settle property issues. 
Plaintiff had been unable to complete discovery proceedings 
because the Defendant was less than cooperative in disclosing 
essential facts about his assets. The Plaintiff offered evidence 
which was not conclusive that the Defendant had been deceptive in 
his testimony regarding his assets, but the evidence did raise 
suspicion of the same. The Court was persuaded that "the assets 
and resources of these parties may not have been explored and 
adjusted as fully as they should have been". The Court 
determined that since his testimony at trial that certain 
investments had a value of "six or seven thousand dollars" was in 
conflict with checks and receipts evidencing purchases of 
approximately $17,000 the discrepancy warranted further 
inspection. The Court characterized the divorce proceeding as 
"equitable in the highest degree". It stated that the material 
residuum of the marriage: 
. . . represents not only the material accumulations of 
the major portion of their lifetimes but perhaps also 
may be regarded by them in some measure as vindication 
of the position each takes toward the other. 
Accordingly, it is essential and appropriate that the 
controversy be given thorough and serious 
consideration. [Id. at 1074] 
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People divorce for various reasons, and there are numerous 
pressures which can make the property distribution less important 
than other issues at the time of the divorce. If a party can 
make use those pressures to take financial advantage, is it fair 
for the court to say to the party to whom full and complete 
disclosure was not made, "Even if you did not get full 
disclosure, you should have known about it some other way, so I'm 
going to say that 'full and complete disclosure' was not really 
required?" As a matter of law the trial court found in the 
present case that full and complete disclosure was made, when at 
best there was an argument that the property could have been 
discovered. 
The instant case is one of a motion to reopen the property 
settlement in a divorce proceeding pursuant to Rule 60(b). This 
is perfectly in harmony with the direction that "A liberal 
standard for application of Rule 60(b) in divorce cases is 
justified ... a court should modify a prior [divorce] decree when 
the interests of equity and fair dealing with the court and the 
opposing party so require." Boyce v. Boyce, supra. 
Evidence has been offered by the Plaintiff showing that 
there are discrepancies between the extent and values of 
properties disclosed by the Defendant-Appellee to the Plaintiff-
Appellant and the extent and values of properties Plaintiff-
Appellant has become aware of on her own. These issues certainly 
deserve revisitation for thorough and serious examination. 
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It should be noted that in the trial court's Order of June 
30, 1993 it did not find the Defendant-Appellee had made a full 
and complete disclosure. Where the Plaintiff-Appellant has shown 
incompleteness in the Defendant-Appellee's disclosure she is 
entitled to face him and demand he do it now. In fact, at one 
point the District Court assumed just that, stating: 
Why don't you prepare a document listing each of the 
properties you think were undisclosed, and then you can 
ask the question, "What was the value of the property, 
equitable or legal?" I don't care which. "Total value 
or net value, owned by Mr. Jacobsen, undisclosed at the 
time of the divorce, if any." [TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
OF NOV 12, 1992, p. 74. ] 
Later in the same hearing the court further directed: 
I'm going to allow you to ask some questions specifically of 
the defendant, as to what the properties were, when they 
were owned, when they were sold. If there are accounts 
receivable, what they were, when they were created, and what 
the payoff status was at the time of the decree. If there 
were other properties owned but transferred to other — 
other owners, but undisclosed to the plaintiff, what they 
were and what the value was. [TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING OF NOV 
12, 1992, p. 80.] 
The Plaintiff-Appellant attempted to discover but such 
attempts were futile. The Defendant-Appellee's responses were 
evasive and uncooperative, as observed by the court: 
Mr. Willmore [Attorney for Defendant-Appellee], you've — I 
don't want to use the term stonewalled, but you've certainly 
resisted some of the discovery requests. [TRANSCRIPT OF 
HEARING OF NOV 12, 1992, p. 77.] 
[See also Addendum J.] The trial court failed to require 
disclosure in spite of what it had said and in spite of 
Plaintiff-Appellant's motions to compel. Eventually, after 
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Plaintiff-Appellant asked detailed questions of the 194 or so 
properties listed in Appendix B and Defendant-Appellee refused to 
answer, the trial court backed down and terminated further 
discovery altogether• Plaintiff-Appellant submits to the court 
that regardless of the size of the estate to be discovered the 
considerations of equity and fairness precede convenience in the 
courts of this state, 
8. In a motion to reopen issues of domestic property settlement, 
where there are contentions of deception, misrepresentation, or 
unfair dealing that would shock the conscience of the court, 
doubts should be resolved in favor of permitting the parties to 
have the issues determined. 
In McBride v. Jones, supra, the Defendant-Appellant sought 
modification of a divorce decree alleging that she had been 
actively deceived by her former husband about the value of family 
property. She alleged her ex-husband represented his ten percent 
interest in a certain partnership "had become worthless". The 
same interest was sold a year after the divorce for about 
$750,000. She also alleged her husband "was in an advantaged 
position having knowledge of those facts" and that she "had a 
right to and did reasonably rely on his representation which 
prevented her from asserting her claim". The McBride Court 
stated: 
. . . in a case such as this of interfamily feuding 
where the contentions make it appear that there is a 
substantial likelihood that the proof may show that a 
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party was so cheated, imposed upon or unfairly dealt 
with that it should shock the conscience of the court 
to allow it to stand, the court should resolve doubts 
in favor of permitting the parties to present their 
evidence and have the issues determined. [Id. at 432.] 
The court stated in JBoyce v. Boyce. supra, at 930, that: 
The determination of what assets are subject to the 
divorce proceeding may not be based on gamesmanship 
calculated to obfuscate the facts; the judicial system 
is not to be manipulated in divorce proceedings by one 
who actively and aggressively misleads the court and 
the opposing party, simply because the opposing party 
was in a small measure delinquent in not discovering 
the fraud prior to entry of a final decree. 
In the instant case, Plaintiff-Appellant seeks modification 
of the property settlement. The Defendant-Appellant made 
affirmative general representations regarding the extent and 
values of his property holdings. He excused himself from a more 
detailed disclosure by asserting Plaintiff-Appellant's non-
interest in all of it. [See Addendums H and I] He kept his 
dealings mostly to himself and Plaintiff-Appellant should not be 
expected to accept no interest when she did not know all he had 
accrued, bought, sold, and transferred during the marriage. 
Plaintiff-Appellant did rely upon Defendant-Appellee's 
representations, but now has evidence he minimized and withheld. 
The amount of the alleged inaccuracies may exceed $500,000 — not 
an inconsequential amount. Such inequitable distribution of 
assets gained during the marriage shocks the conscience. The 
Plaintiff-Appellant is entitled to have the evidence and the 
issues examined fully and resolved fairly and completely. 
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9. The trial court should have construed ambiguities in the 
meaning of the word "disclosure11 against the Defendant-Appellee 
who drafted the Stipulation agreement. 
The Stipulation of August 27, 1987 was drafted by Attorney 
Thomas Willmore, who represented the Defendant-Appellee. The 
rule in Utah, as in most jurisdictions, is that "courts construe 
contracts against their drafters", Nielson v. O'Reilly. 848 P.2d 
664, 666 (Utah 1992), and "[i]n the event of uncertainty, as to 
the meaning of a contract, it is construed most strictly against 
its framer", Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538 (Utah 1977) 
The finding of the District Court of June 30, 1993, is that: 
'the term "disclosure" as used in paragraph 10 [of the 
court's Order of August 28, 1987] means either a 
disclosure by the Defendant to the Plaintiff, 
independent knowledge of the Plaintiff concerning 
property, or knowledge of the Plaintiff pursuant to her 
own investigation." 
This finding clearly is against the Plaintiff-Appellant and for 
the Defendant-Appellee. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant asserts the term "disclosure" means 
an impartation of information by each party — that Plaintiff-
Appellant had disclosed to Defendant-Appellee, and vice-versa. 
In the Stipulation each only stipulated to his or her own 
impartation, not the others. Note there is no waiver clause in 
the Stipulation waiving the other's failure to disclose. 
Since these two interpretations differ critically and the 
Plaintiff-Appellant's interpretation is not unreasonable, it 
should have been given deference. As the preceding discussion 
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has born out, not only was Plaintiff-Appellant's interpretation 
reasonable, it conforms to the usual meaninq of the term, which 
meaninq has been supported by textual and circumstantial 
analysis. On the other hand, Defendant-Appellee's and the trial 
court's interpretation of the meaninq of the term "disclosure" is 
the more unusual. On this point alone, Plaintiff-Appellant's 
motion to set aside and reopen issues of property settlement 
should be qranted. This time Defendant-Appellee should be 
required to answer all relevant and necessary questions reqardinq 
his assets or furnish the information some other way. 
10. If the meaning of the term "disclosure11 is found to be 
ambiguous and the interpretations by Plaintiff-Appellant and 
Defendant-Appellee are equally reasonable, then there was not a 
meeting of the minds sufficient to form a contract. The 
Stipulation of August 27, 1987 and the Order which derived 
therefrom would be void and the parties must find themselves at 
the point prior to Stipulation. 
The common law of contracts requires that there be a meetinq 
of the minds and that such meetinq occur when the contract is 
formed. A number of equitable exceptions exist, but are not 
relevant to the case at hand. Where no meetinq of the minds has 
occurred there is no contract. The Supreme Court of Utah noted 
in Simonson v. Travis, 728 P.2d 999 (Utah 1986) that an Ohio 
court invalidated a release of a claim for personal injury since 
no meetinq of the minds had occurred and declared: 
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[T]he court of chancery will not allow the releasee to take 
advantage of general words [drafted by the releasee] to 
defeat the collection of a demand not then in the minds of 
the parties. [Id. at 1002.] 
The court then voided a release drafted with ambiguous language 
by the putative releasee. 
In this case the disputed language must be decided for the 
Plaintiff-Appellant or determined to be ambiguous. If decided 
for the Plaintiff-Appellant the motion of the Plaintiff-Appellant 
to set aside and reopen property settlement issues should have 
been granted. If decided to find ambiguity then no meeting of 
the minds has occurred and consequently there can be no contract 
— in which case again the motion should have been equitably 
granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments in this brief, the Court of Appeals 
should overturn the Findings of Fact and Order of the District 
Court of June 30, 1993. More specifically the Court should find 
that the Trial Court's interpretation of the meaning of the term 
"disclosure" is in error and that all Findings of Fact relying 
upon the erroneous interpretation are consequently in error also. 
This Court should find that the term "disclosure", as used 
in Paragraph 9 of the Stipulation of August 27, 1987 and in 
Paragraph 10 of the Court's Order of August 28, 1987, means an 
impartation of information from each party to the other. The 
court should further find that in stipulating that a full and 
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complete disclosure had been made, that each party stipulated 
only to his or her own impartation of information. 
Additionally, this Court should find that the adjectives 
"full and complete" modify the term "disclosure" and that the 
effect of such modification is to require that the information 
disclosed by each party to the other should be sufficient for 
that other party to readily discern, calculate, and evaluate that 
party's monetary or divisible interest in all the marital 
properties and assets whether still retained or not. 
Upon overturning the Court's Findings of Fact and Order, the 
Court of Appeals should remand this case to the Trial Court for a 
determination of whether a full and complete disclosure, as 
defined by the Court of Appeals, has occurred in this case. If 
such disclosure has not occurred, the Trial Court should be 
required to grant the Plaintiff-Appellant's Motion to Set Aside 
Divorce Decree and for New Trial on Issues of Property 
Settlement. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant requests the court award her 
attorney's fees and costs of filing this appeal. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A 
Summary of Real Property Disclosed by Defendant-Appellee 
Prior to Stipulation of August 27, 1987. 
(From May 1, 1987 conference/pre-trial notes of Attorney 
John Caine - Found in court records Book I, pp. 87-88) 
1. COUNTRY CLUB DRIVE HOME LOGAN 
2. BEAR LAKE HOUSE (CABIN) 
3. 1/2 WESTERN EX.SUITES BLD. 666 NORTH MAIN, LOGAN 
4. RICHMOND LOTS 15 ACRES CHERRY CREEK 
5. LAKE EDGE HILLS 5 LOTS PLUS 2 ACRES 
6. GRANDVIEW HILLS 2 PARTIAL DEV. LOTS 1/2 ACRE EACH 
7. BRIDLEWOOD HILLS 1/6 PTR. IN 80 ACRES UNDEVELOPED 
8. WESTON BLDG. (6,700.00) TAX BENEFIT 
9. NAVAJO HILLS 27 ACRES 
10. KNOLLS (KNOWLES) LOT 1 BLDG LOT 
11. MEADOW VILLAGE CONDO (TOWNHOUSE) 
12. MINIATURE GOLF - BLDG. LOT 1 1/2 ACRE 
(From Defendant's Summary of Property - Found in court 
records Book I, pp.117—) 
*1. COUNTRY CLUB DRIVE HOME IN LOGAN, UTAH 
*2. BEAR LAKE CABIN, LAKE EDGE HILLS SUBDIVISION, LOT 32, 
GARDEN CITY, UTAH 
*3. LAKE EDGE HILLS SUBDIVISION LOTS 
4. BONANZA DEVELOPMENT OFFICE BUILDING, LOGAN, UTAH 
*5. MINIATURE GOLF COURSE, LOGAN, UTAH 
*6. CHERRY CREEK PROPERTY, RICHMOND, UTAH (Richmond lots) 
*7. BRIDLEWOOD HILLS SUBDIVISION, HYDE PARK, UTAH, 76 ACRES 
*8. GRANDVIEW HILLS SUBDIVISION, 2 LOTS, PROVIDENCE, UTAH 
*9. NAVAJO HILLS, BLANDING, UTAH, 25 ACRES OF RAW DESERT 
* - Duplication of disclosure in section I above. 
(NO MARITAL PURCHASE PROPERTY LISTED) 
Appendix B 
Summary Partial List of Real Property Not Disclosed 
by Defendant-Appellee Prior to Stipulation of August 27, 1987. 
Lot 2, Unit 1, 
Lot 3, Unit 1, 
Lot 4, Unit 1, 
Lot 20, Unit 1, 
Lot 21, Unit 1, 
Lot 22, Unit 1, 
Lot 24, Unit 1, 
Utah. 
Utah. 
Cache County, Utah. 
Cache County, Utah. 
1. Improved Lot 2, Block 10, in Weston City, Franklin 
County, Idaho. 
2. Commercial Lot, BONANZA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Cache 
County, Utah. 
2.54 acres, CHERRY CREEK, Cache County, Utah. 
Lot 1, Unit 1, GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
Lot 5, Unit 1, GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
Lot 19, Unit 1, GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
Lot 30, Unit 1, GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
North strip of land, 1 foot wide, 0.01 acre, Unit 1, 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
16. Lot 31, Unit 1, GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
south of Lot 31, Unit 1, Cache County, 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10, 
11, 
12, 
13. 
14. 
15. 
17, 
Cache County, 
Cache County, 
Cache County, 
Utah. 
Utah. 
Utah. 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah, 
south of Lot 32, Unit 1, GRAND VIEW 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah, 
south of Lot 33, Unit 1, GRAND VIEW 
1, GRAND VIEW 
Unit 1, GRAND 
Parcel of land, 
Utah. 
18. Lot 32, Unit 1, 
19. Parcel of land, 
HILLS, Cache County, Utah 
20. Lot 33, Unit 1, 
21. Parcel of land, 
HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
22. Parcel of land, south of Lot 34, Unit 
HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
23. Parcel of land, next south of Lot 34, 
VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
24. Lot 1, Unit 2, GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
25. Lot 2, Unit 2, GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
26. Lot 3, Unit 2, GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
27. Lot 5, Unit 2, GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
28. South strip of land, 2 feet wide, 0.02 acres, Unit 2, 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
29. Lot 4 West, west of Lot 4, Unit 2, 
Cache County, Utah. 
30. Lot 5 West, west of Lot 5, Unit 2, 
Cache County, Utah. 
Cache County, 
Cache County, 
Cache County, 
Utah. 
Utah. 
Utah. 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
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31. 19.2 acres, south and west of Unit 2, GRAND VIEW HILLS, 
Cache County, Utah. 
32. 16.97 acres, west of the 19.2 acres south and west of 
Unit 2, GRAND VIEW HILLS, Cache County, Utah. 
33. 4.0 acres, west of the above 16.97 acres, Cache County, 
Utah. 
34. .38 acres, surrounded on three sides of above 16.97 
acres, Cache County, Utah. 
35. 10.43 acres, associated with GRAND VIEW HILLS original 
land purchases in Cache County, Utah. 
36. 3.76 acres, associated with GRAND VIEW HILLS original 
land purchases in Cache County, Utah. 
37. 4.06 acres, associated with GRAND VIEW HILLS original 
land purchases in Cache County, Utah. 
38. 3.46 acres, associated with GRAND VIEW HILLS original 
land purchases in Cache County, Utah. 
39. Lot 5, KNOWLES SUBDIVISION, Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
Unit 29, MEADOW VILLAGE, Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
Unit 30, MEADOW VILLAGE, Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
Unit 31, MEADOW VILLAGE, Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
Unit 32, MEADOW VILLAGE, Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
Unit at 285 West 600 North, Logan, Tax #07-138-0033, 
MEADOW VILLAGE, Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
45. Common area, described as Tax #07-138-0033, in MEADOW 
VILLAGE, Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
0.31 acres, Tax #05-065-0010, in Extension #1 Amendment 
of the VAL-VIEW SUBDIVISION, Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
0.09 acres, Tax #07-096-0009, in Extension #2 of the 
VIEW SUBDIVISION, Logan, Cache County, Utah. 
Lot 1301, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 13, Davis 
County, Utah. 
Lot 1310, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 13, Davis 
County, Utah. 
Lot 1311, or numbered Lot 1, KING CLARION HILLS 
SUBDIVISION NO. 13, or NO. 14, Davis County, Utah. 
51. Lot 1308, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 13, Davis 
County, Utah. 
52. 3.14 acres, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 14, 
Davis County, Utah. 
11-039-0015, 
VAL-
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
46, 
47, 
48, 
49, 
50, 
53. .033 acres, Tax No 
Davis County, Utah. 
54. .035 acres, 
Davis County, Utah. 
55. .085 acres, 
Davis County, Utah. 
56. Parcel of land, 11-040-0035, Ref 
HILLS, Davis County, Utah. 
KING CLARION HILLS, 
Tax No. 11-041-0007, KING CLARION HILLS, 
Tax No. 11-049-1310, KING CLARION HILLS, 
#252664, KING CLARION 
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57. Parcel of land, 11-040-0044, Ref. #306760, KING CLARION 
HILLS, Davis County, Utah. 
58. Parcel of land, 11-040-0053, Ref. #96738, KING CLARION 
HILLS, Davis County, Utah. 
59. Lot 1003, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 10, Davis 
County, Utah. 
60. Lot 1019, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 10, Davis 
County, Utah. 
61. Lot 1106, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 11, Davis 
County, Utah. 
62. Lot 1107, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 11, Davis 
County, Utah. 
63. Lot 1201, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 12, Davis 
County, Utah. 
64. Lot 1202, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 12, Davis 
County, Utah. 
65. Lot 1205, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 12, Davis 
County, Utah. 
66. Lot 1206, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 12, Davis 
County, Utah. 
67. Lot 1207, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 12, Davis 
County, Utah. 
68. Lot 1208, KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION NO. 12, Davis 
County, Utah. 
69. through 91. (23 Lots) KING CLARION HILLS SUBDIVISION 
NO. 14, Davis County, Utah. 
92. through 150. Lots No. 1 through No. 59, as if 
separately set out, all in ABEL ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
151. Lot 22, Block B, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
152. Lot 34, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
153. Lot 11, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
154. Lot 1, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
155. Lot 25, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
156. Lot 26, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
157. Lot 28, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
158. Lot 29, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
159. Lot 30, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
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160. Lot 31, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
161. Lot 32, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
162. Lot 33, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
163. Lot 35, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
164. Lot 18, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
165. Lot 8, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
166. Lot 9, Block D, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
167. Lot 1, Block A, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
168. Lot 5, Block A, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
169. Lot 6, Block A, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
170. Lot 7, Block A, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
171. Lot 12, Block C, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
172. Lot 22, Block C, NAVAJO HILLS SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
173. 8.64 acres, 3-1E-2-1A, along Highway, 665 feet north 
504 feet to beginning, Kane County, Utah. 
174. 26.26 acres, 3-1E-2-1A, 0059074, Kane County, Utah. 
175. Lot 31, 11.17 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
176. Lot 35, 7.24 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
177. Lot 28, 9.76 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
178. Lot 29, 13.13 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
179. Lot 30, 9.01 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
180. Lot 32, 5.68 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
181. Lot 33, 1.75 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
182. Lot 34, 4.80 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
183. Lot 25, 21.67 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
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184. Lot 7, 2.27 acres, NORTH ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
185. Lot 2, 12.93 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
186. Lot 3, 16.25 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
187. Lot 4, 24.26 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
188. Lot 5, 5.33 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
189. Lot 6, 1.26 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
190. Lot 8, 4.10 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
191. Lot 9, 3.77 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
192. Lot 10, 1.93 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
193. Lot 12, .87 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane County, 
Utah. 
194. Lot 13, 4.52 acres, WEST ACRES SUBDIVISION, Kane 
County, Utah. 
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